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ABSTRACT  
Civil Asset Forfeiture (CAF) is a longstanding and 
controversial legal process viewed on the one hand as 
a powerful tool for combating drug crimes and on the 
other hand as a violation of the rights of US citizens. 
Data used to support both sides of the controversy to 
date has come from government sources representing 
records of the events at the time of occurrence. Court 
dockets represent litigation events initiated following 
the forfeiture, however, and can thus provide a new 
perspective on the CAF legal process. This paper will 
show new evidence supporting existing claims about 
the growth of the practice and bias in its application 
based on the quantitative analysis of data derived 
from these court cases. 
1.BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM  
Civil Asset Forfeiture (CAF) is a controversial legal process 
in which law enforcement seizes assets from individuals 
without criminal charges. As such, it is known as an “in 
rem” proceeding wherein a legal case may be brought 
against the seized property itself, with the burden of proof to 
reclaim such property resting on the property owner, not the  
plaintiff. Although property can be forfeited either through a 
civil or criminal proceeding, civil forfeiture is a dispute 
between law enforcement and the property itself if the 
property in question was suspected of being used in a 
violation of law [18]. 
 
The legal validity of CAF has been questioned and 
discussed since its widespread adoption following the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 [6, 8, 11]. Most 
of the relevant literature focuses on the efficacy of the 
process with respect to crime reduction [17], bias in the 
implementation of the process [9,10,15], or evidence of 
corruption in the methods of implementation [1,18]. 
Evidence used to support claims in all three areas of 
investigation comes mainly from Department of Justice 
enforcement data, law enforcement records, or personal 
communications with law enforcement and government 
officials. However, most current research does not rely at all 
on data from court dockets. Court dockets document the 
aftermath of CAF events in ways that shed new light on the 
fundamental questions of fairness and efficacy in the 
practice.  
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This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of court 
dockets related to CAF cases covering the full set of U.S. 
jurisdictions. Our analysis shows that the increase in the 
practice over time suggested in the literature is mirrored in 
the volume of litigation. We also compare the value of assets 
seized from the Equitable Sharing Program (ESP) for 2015, 
which permits property seized locally to be forfeited 
federally. We show that despite an increase in the practice of 
CAF overall, the distribution of proceeds does not display 
evidence of a law enforcement bias in particular states but 
rather tracks with state population. However, certain trends 
in recent years towards single-party state cases support 
suggestions that local law enforcement may be targeting 
individuals.  
 
2.DATA AND METHODS  
Our data consists of a total of 117,199 total court dockets 
representing 922 U.S. localities and municipalities and 50 
states for the years 1966 to 20151. Of that total, 31,117 (26%) 
are federal dockets and 40,863 (35%) are state dockets. The 
remaining 39% had no designation in the metadata for 
Federal or State jurisdiction but had a jurisdiction code for an 
area outside the U.S. (e.g. Virgin Islands or Guam), which 
were eliminated from the sample (<1%), or were local 
jurisdictions not mapped to states. This brought our total 
dockets available for analysis by state to 71,491 dockets. 
Figure 1 shows total case volume by year.  
 
Dockets pertaining to CAF were aggregated by two methods. 
First, we conducted a full-text search of the Bloomberg Law 
dockets repository for civil case documents containing an 
amount of U.S. currency. The cases cover four main Nature 
of Suit codes: 625, “Drug Related Seizure of Property”; 690, 
“Forfeit/Penalty Other”; 620, “Forfeit/Penalty Food and 
Drug”; and 890, “Other Statutory Actions”.  
 
Next, we extracted the metadata from the civil case 
documents into a set of attributes, and filtered based on some 
of the values following manual review. Our attributes were 
the following: Cash Amount (normalized as integer), 
Document ID, Publication Date (as year, month, and day), 
Party Type (as list of Plaintiff, Petitioner, Defendant, or other 
relevant designations), Jurisdiction, Cause of Action, Nature 
of Suit, Case Status (open, closed, or unknown), Court Type 
(State or Federal) and Pleading (as text field). Our study 
focuses specifically on cases where an amount of money is 
one of the parties to the case, as this fact qualifies the case as 
an “in rem” proceeding typical of the CAF process. We note 
that additional parties are often included and this does not 
disqualify a case from the “in rem” designation. 
 
We also collected data from the Department of Justice 
                                                
1 This data is available by request 
Equitable Sharing Program Annual Reports for 2013-
2016 2 . The reports provide amounts of cash that the 
program distributes to local (non-federal) law enforcement 
as payment for aiding in the CAF process. These amounts 
represent a percentage of the total cash amounts seized. 
From these reports we mapped data from local precincts to 
court jurisdictions. This enabled us to compare totals 
reported from Equitable Sharing with totals reported in 
cases from courts in corresponding states. Court 
jurisdictions were then mapped to states. Finally, we 
created a table of “burden of proof classes” by state. This 
table was based on three Proof designations described in 
[3]. 
 
3.RELATED WORK 
Related work has focused on CAF since the 1990s. The main 
perspectives are legal and social, viewing the practice as a 
legal artifact on one hand and a social injustice on the other. 
The present analysis is focused mostly on the latter, as issues 
of the frequency, distribution, and characteristics of the 
practice are generally discussed from this perspective. Data 
from dockets is necessarily a subset of the set of total CAF 
events, since only individuals who choose to litigate a CAF 
action in court will appear as a record in this dataset. We do 
not know the exact percent of instances of the practice that 
this represents and will not address that question in this 
analysis. 
 
Figure 1: CAF Case Volume by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Data is found here: https://www.justice.gov/afp/fy2016-
equitable-sharing-payments-cash-and-sale-proceeds-recipient-
agency-state 
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Figure 2: CAF Dollars per Year 
 
 
Figure 3: CAF Case Volume by State 
 
 
3.1.ASSET FORFEITURE AND NON-RANDOM 
ENFORCEMENT 
A common perspective related to social inequality is that 
CAF incidents disproportionally affect particular segments of 
the population due to law enforcement profiling [4,7,14]. A 
proposed rationale for bias in CAF implementation is the 
idea that economically disadvantaged groups are less likely 
to litigate [4]. In addition, [16] contends that how the states 
are allowed to use the funds (independent of how much of 
the proceeds are allowed to be kept) encourages enforcement 
bias. It is proposed that Texas, Georgia, and Virginia in 
particular have such incentives due to the latitude in the use 
of these funds. Texas and Georgia in particular are discussed 
with respect to implementation bias resulting from this 
condition in [2]. 
 
Bias in enforcement is also discussed with respect to border 
states. It is proposed in [12] that increasing law enforcement 
intelligence sharing following 2001 Homeland Security 
initiatives allowed new levels of profiling as racial and ethnic 
information on motorists became available. One particularly 
popular intelligence system known as Black Asphalt 
Electronic Networking and Notification System has enabled 
police nationwide to share information on individuals, 
despite warnings from state and federal authorities that doing  
 
 
so may violate civil liberties and constitutional rights of 
individuals.  
 
3.2.ASSET FORFEITURE AND CONFLICTING 
MOTIVATION 
It is proposed in much of the literature that law enforcement 
agencies are motivated both to increase the practice of CAF 
and pursue larger assets [3,16]. This is blamed on the 
Equitable Sharing Program and on a judicial process 
favoring the government over the owner of the assets. 
 
The judicial process is reported to have bias in several 
respects. First, the standard of proof required to seize 
property differs by state. For example, in [3] it is noted that 
31 states declare “preponderance of evidence” as the 
standard of proof to seize property. This standard mandates 
that a claim be argued based on a superiority in weight, 
force, or importance of the evidence rather than the amount 
of evidence. This is opposed to the stricter standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”, adopted in only two states. 
Second, state laws differ as to whether they allow local law 
enforcement agencies to access seized funds. Only seven 
states and the District of Columbia block law enforcement 
access to forfeiture proceeds [3]. The rest allow different 
portions up to 100%. 
 
4.FORFEITURE IN JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
In this section we provide our analysis of U.S. court cases 
related to CAF and discuss the relation between these 
findings and those in the literature. We review general 
summary statistics for court cases, and correlations between 
those cases and other government-collected data sets.  
 
4.1 GENERAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CAF CASES 
As Figure 1 shows, the number of cases year-over-year 
increases in two areas of the graph. We see an increase 
beginning in the mid-1990s and again in the mid-2000s. The 
first increase may be explained by case filings being a 
lagging indicator of a change in legislation. That is, this 
increase may be an effect of the passage of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, possibly 
comingled with an effect from the War on Drugs of the 
Reagan years.  
 
The later increase is a bit harder to explain, as major 
legislation such as the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
2000 would be an unlikely cause of an increase in CAF. One 
possible explanation is the increase in bank account seizures 
by the IRS that was reported between 2005 and 2012 [13]. 
There is a likely comingled effect with the U.S. Recession as 
well, since it has been proposed [5] that asset forfeitures 
increase in hard economic times. 
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Figure 2 shows total dollars per year. The trend is generally 
upward. The rise in the mid-1990s in dollars in Figure 2 is 
likely explained by an amendment to 19 U.S. § 1607 
allowing administrative asset forfeitures up to $500,000, 
where the previous limit before 1990 was $100,000. Thus 
after this point, larger cases were fair game for CAF, 
accruing more money for local law enforcement per case. 
 
Figure 3 shows total case volume by state for the years 2010-
2015. Not surprisingly, larger states have more cases in 
general. Figure 4 shows case volume by state compared with 
state population for the year 20153. We would expect state 
population to track closely with case volume if no external 
forces or biases were affecting the practice of seizures. 
Despite claims in the literature that particular state legislation 
is favorable to law enforcement regarding both burden of 
proof for challenging seizures and the rigor of the criteria for 
initiating a seizure [3], the case volume generally tracks with 
population. However, there are some notable exceptions. 
Nevada, Oklahoma, and Arizona have a larger than expected 
share of cases and share the common factor of being allowed 
to keep 100% of the proceeds distributed by law enforcement 
[3]. One possible explanation is that full access to CAF 
proceeds motivates more seizure actions and thus results in 
more seizure actions being challenged by property owners. 
Maryland may be an outlier for independent reasons of 
district caseload4.  
 
We do not see a parallel in the money amount sums by state 
for 2015 in Figure 5. In fact, total sums per state do not 
correlate as well with state population despite having no 
discernable outlier groups.  
 
The Kendall’s rank correlations are .51 for the Case Volume 
by Population with the outlier states and .60 when the 
outliers are removed, and .38 for the money amounts by 
population. All are significant with P < .001.  
 
The fact that the dollar amounts correlate relatively poorly 
with population compared to case volume may indicate some 
bias in the practice of CAF. However, it could also be 
explained by actual spikes in drug crime that may run 
counter to the population.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 We selected 2015 as a snapshot because it is both the latest year 
for which complete Bloomberg data is available and also 
represents a year for which Equitable sharing data is available. 
4 Data available from the courts from 2010 suggests that Maryland 
has an unusually high civil caseload in general. See 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: CAF 2015 Case Volume by State Population 
 
 
Figure 5: CAF 2015 Case Amount Sums by State Population 
 
We divided the data by Party Type, so we could count the 
number of defendants in a case. Since these are in rem cases, 
defendants may include amounts of currency, goods, values 
of goods and individuals. Figure 6 shows the percentage of 
Party Types from 1 party to 8+ parties by year from 1990-
2015 5  for State cases. Figure 7 shows the same data for 
Federal cases. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Party data from our Bloomberg docket metadata contained some 
noise in cases prior to 1990 that obscured this sample.  
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Figure 6: State Cases, Percent of Cases by Number of 
Defendants, per Year 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Federal Cases, Percent of Cases by Number of 
Defendants, per Year 
 
 
 
Larger numbers of defendants are generally present in cases 
involving either additional assets or assets belonging to more 
than one individual. We note that the recent increase in 
single-party state cases could point to a shift in the nature of 
CAF towards individuals by local law enforcement, as much 
of the literature has proposed. Since defendants may be 
individuals or property, the increase may alternatively reflect 
a trend towards seizing fewer, more valuable assets. The 
trend in the Federal cases trends slightly upward for multi-
party cases, but remains mostly flat over time. 	
 
 
4.2 COURT CASES AND EXTERNAL CLASSES 
This section explores external factors and their effect on 
CAF case trends. Such factors include legal conditions 
affecting the ability for an individual to bring a case against 
the government or programs providing an incentive to Law 
Enforcement to perpetuate the practice. They also include 
physical factors such as location of the state on the United 
States Border, the amount of assets in question and the 
number of individuals.  
4.2.1 STATES, CASE DISTRIBUTION AND 
“BURDEN OF PROOF” LEGISLATION 
To investigate whether the three Burden of Proof Classes 
discussed in [3] affected the volume of cases, we reviewed 
the case volume for 2015 against two of the three classes, 
“Owner Burden” and “Government Burden”, as only five 
states have a conditional burden that depends on the property 
in question. We found that case volume for the 11 states 
where the burden of proof is on the Government track 
closely with population (Kendall’s rank = .78, P < .005), 
despite suggestions in [3] that this condition favors the 
petitioner. On the other hand, case volume for the 35 states 
where the burden of proof is on the property owner correlates 
weakly (Kendall’s rank = .45, P< .001). However, the same 
outlier states from Figure 3 are evident here as well. When 
those are removed, the rank correlation is .58, P <.001.  
 
This suggests that the Burden of Proof is not an important 
predictor of case volume, neither encouraging nor 
discouraging the public from claiming property. It is possible 
that the burden of proof is simply not important to a 
petitioner given the incentive of recovering property, or that 
the public is simply unaware of the designation in question 
and thus is not influenced either way. 
 
4.2.2 STATES, CASH VALUE AND EQUITABLE 
SHARING PARTICIPATION 
To examine the effect of Equitable Sharing Program 
distributions, we plotted Equitable Sharing Program cash 
proceeds by state for the year 2015 in Figure 8. Here, the 
rank correlation between state cash proceeds and state 
population is much stronger than the rank correlation 
between case cash amounts and population per state shown 
in Figure 5, with Kendall’s rank coefficient at .73, P < .001. 
 
This is a surprising result given that Equitable Sharing is 
largely blamed in the literature for encouraging bias in the 
practice. However it is possible that the Equitable Sharing 
Program is responsible for an overall growth in the practice, 
and could indeed be one factor driving the rise in cases in the 
mid-2000s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: 2015 Equitable Sharing Cash Proceeds by State 
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4.3 COURT CASES AND POPULATION SEGMENTS 
Very few dockets have specific information on the owners 
of the property. About 400 Texas cases had such 
information, but this was insufficient to determine any 
general trends in the character of CAF practice by law 
enforcement, such as particular racial or ethnic biases.  
 
We also cannot show by negative evidence that individuals 
fail to pursue court cases for small amounts of cash or are 
intimidated from doing so by any prevailing judicial 
condition in any state. However, the general trends in 
Figure 6 indicate that single-party cases are becoming more 
frequent on the state level, suggesting a trend towards 
targeting individuals. Federal cases tend to involve larger 
numbers of parties.  
 
Finally, case volume data does not show any bias against or 
in favor of border states such as Texas, Arizona, California, 
and New Mexico. Rather, the case volume in 2015 tracks 
with state population. Thus, proposed effects of homeland 
security inspired law enforcement data-sharing do not seem 
to appear in this particular data set. Of course, this is not 
counter-evidence to border state bias in the practice of 
CAF, as small seizures from individuals may indeed be 
more prevalent in these states but would not be recorded in 
this data set. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have shown data from civil forfeiture court cases 
supporting the increases in the practice of CAF discussed in  
the large body of existing literature that focuses on these 
events. We believe that the trends in case volume over time  
suggest that court cases are a lagging indicator of impactful 
legislation such as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984.  
 
We have shown weak positive correlations with case volume 
and state population for the year 2015. In addition, we found 
a very weak positive correlation with case money amounts 
for that same year. Neither result provides any real positive 
or negative evidence for a contention of bias in the practice 
of CAF. We did note a group of positive outlier states in case 
volume that shared a common factor, but this cannot be said 
to be causal in any way as other states sharing the factor are 
not outliers. An analysis of Equitable Sharing Program 
proceeds data for the same year similarly showed a positive 
correlation with state population.  
 
Finally we note that the number of parties per case appears to 
decrease with time for State dockets while for Federal 
dockets it remains stable, slightly increasing to larger 
numbers of parties. This may indicate a local law 
enforcement trend towards targeting individuals. Again, we 
cannot draw a positive conclusion about bias in the practice 
of CAF based on this finding, but note that the trend in state 
cases is consistent with certain proposals in the literature.  
 
In future work we propose to conduct a more in-depth 
investigation of external factors such as state unemployment, 
poverty rates, crime statistics, and civilian travel patterns. We 
will also focus more closely on aspects of the existing set, 
such as the text of the pleadings, associated opinion 
documents, or the case outcomes, which were not used for 
the present study. 
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